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EXPERIENCE RATING
ALMON R. ARNOLD"
THE funds from which benefits are paid under the state unemploy-
ment compensation systems are obtained almost uniformly from pay-
roll taxes levied on employers. In most states the tax is a differential
tax. Rates are varied with relation in some degree to the past employ-
ment experience of each employer, in accordance with widely differing
methods. The variation of employers' tax rates by these methods is
known today as experience rating.'
The differential employer tax was introduced in the first State un-
employment compensation law adopted in this country, the Wisconsin
Unemployment Compensation and Reserves Act of 1932. The system
which the act created was fashioned after existing workmen's compen-
sation plans and provided for contributions by employers alone to
individual reserve accounts administered by the state. Each employ-
er's rate was varied on the basis of the size of his reserve. The methods
of financing thus provided represented a departure from the arrange-
ments of existing foreign systems which generally obtained their funds,
which were pooled, from contributions paid by employers and em-
ployees or by employers, employees, and the government, and made no
provision for differentiation in the payments of employers.2 The pat-
tern of financing which the Wisconsin law established strongly in-
fluenced the development of the other state systems. When state-
wide pooled fund plans were formulated, whether including provisions
for employer contributions alone or for both employer and employee
contributions, room was found in them for differentiating the employ-
ers' payments. This met "the Wisconsin idea halfway." 3 By the time
the Social Security Act was passed, the variable employer tax had a
firm position in the thinking concerning the contribution structure ap-
propriate to a system of unemployment compensation.4
t Principal Attorney, Federal Security Agency.
Opinions expressed herein are the author's and are not intended to reflect the official
views of the Federal Security Agency or of the Social Security Board.
1. Terminology has not been consistent. As applied to pooled fund systems, differen-
tiation of employers' rates was at one time generally called "merit rating."
2. For a discussion of measures resembling experience rating in foreign systems see
RICHARD A. LESTER AND CHARLES V. KIDD, THE CASE AGAINST EXPERIENCE RATING
(1939) 14-20;-IERNIAN FELDMAN AND DONALD M. SMITH, THE CASE FOR EXPERIENCE
RATING (1939) 12-3; Maher, Some Experiments with Contribution Rate Differentials in
British Unemployment Insurance, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, Dec. 1943, pp. 34-40.
3. Rubinow, The Movement Toward Unemployment Insurance in Ohio (1933) 7 SOCIAL
SERVICE REv. 175, 201.
4. For a review of the early development of the financial methods employed by the
state systems, see Malisoff, The Emergence of Unemployment Compensation: II (1939) S4
POL. Sci. Q. 391.
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The Social Security Act did not require the states to finance their
systems through a tax on employers alone nor did it require them to
vary the rates at which payments from employers were collected.
These problems were turned back to the states, but under conditions
that strongly favored the adoption of both measures. First, the payroll
tax which the Act imposed on employers, with its offsetting credits for
taxes paid under a state unemployment compensation law, provided a
method of financing that furnished the tax base necessary to experi-
ence rating. Second, the additional credit provisions of the Act sup-
plied the means whereby reductions in rates which the states permitted
could be made effective through a corresponding reduction in the
employer's federal tax.
In the years following the passage of the Social Security Act, the use
of the employer payroll tax, with experience rating, as the sole method
of financing spread rapidly as the state unemployment compensation
systems were created and put into operation. There are only four states
today which require worker contributions.' Experience rating forms
an integral part of all but six of the systems.6
OBJECTIVES OF ExPErIENCE RATING
The avowed objectives of experience rating in unemployment com-
pensation may be stated quite simply: first, the prevention of unem-
ployment by inducing employers to stabilize their operations, and,
second, the allocation of the social costs of unemployment to the indi-
vidual business concerns responsible for those costs. Both objectives
have their sources in social and economic views of the functions of an
unemployment compensation system and the methods appropriate to
its financing. The first was early identified with what was considered
the primary objective of an unemployment compensation system itself.
Unemployment compensation "must include both an attempt to reduce
the hazard [of unemployment] to its smallest possible proportions, and
provision for compensating the unemploy.ment that remains." 7 The
differential employer tax under this conception of unemployment com-
pensation was viewed less as a revenue measure, adequate to finance
any extensive system of benefits for the unemployed, than as a tax to
discourage unemployment and thereby to eliminate the need for bene-
fits. The objective of cost allocation is often coupled ith the first ob-
jective as a sort of by-product of a measure designed primarily to pro-
5. Alabama, California, New Jersey, and Rhode Island.
6. The states requiring a uniform payroll tax are Alasa, M_issippi, Montana,
Rhode Island, Utah, Washington.
7. Brandeis, TIe Eizployer Reserve Type of Unzemp!oyment Coinpmsafion Law (1936)
3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 54, 56. See also Raushenbush, The Wisconsin Idea: Unrmp!oy-
ment Reserves (1933) 170 ANNALS 65; Burns, Unemp!oymenl Compcnsation and Soagi-Eco-
nornic Objecties, page 1, supra.
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mote the stabilization of employment. But it is also accounted for
independently, partly on grounds of social fiscal policy which is viewed
as requiring the allocation of the costs of unemployment to "the busi-
ness units which are at least proximately responsible for it" so that
such costs may be reflected in the prices charged consumers, and
partly on grounds of fairness in the distribution of costs among em-
ployers."
Unemployment Prevention.
Experience rating viewed as a preventive measure rests on the as-
sumption that employers have a substantial degree of control over
unemployment and that differential rates will serve as an effective in-
centive to employers to stabilize their operationsY Those who favor
rate differentiation as an incentive device in unemployment compensa-
tion point to workmen's compensation plans where differential rating
schemes have had a significant effect in reducing industrial accidents
and occupational diseases. On the other side are those who see unem-
ployment as essentially a different problem from that involved in work
injuries. The major causes of unemployment, they believe, are beyond
the control of the individual employer; unlike the causes of work acci-
dents, which have their source within the plant, unemployment is due
largely to national and international forces over which employers have
little or no control.1" It is further suggested that even where individual
firms have the ability to decrease the irregularity of their employment,
the gains that they achieve may be at the expense of the stability of
other employers. For example, the action of an employer in diversifying
8. Raushenbush, The Wisconsin Idea: Unemployment Reserves (1933) 170 ANNALS
65; Brandeis, The Employer Reserve Type of Unemployment Compensation Law (1936) 3 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 54. Fundamentally rate variation in unemployment compensation
reflects "the normal desire or effort to achieve some sort of fair proportion between the
degree of hazard and the rate of contribution upon industry as the hazard-carrying factor."
Rubinow, State Pool Plans and Merit Rating (1936) 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 65, 79. See
also Witte, Experience Rating and Other Forms of Incentive Taxation to Promote Employment
in NATIONAL TAX ASS'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THIRTY-FOURTH NAT. CONF. ON TAXATION
(1941) 479.
9. "At any rate the Wisconsin unemployment reserves plan assumes that much of our
chronic irregularity of jobs should prove gradually preventable, and that compensation laws
should encourage rather than penalize efforts in that direction." Raushenbush, The Wis.
consin Idea: Unemployment Reserves (1933) 170 ANNALS 65, 70. Some apprehension has
been voiced whether employment stabilization is in itself a desirable social goal, since it
might mean under a low volume of employment that one group of workers would be steadily
employed while another would be unemployed. See RICHARD A. LESTER, ECONOMIICS OF
LABOR .1941) 448; REPORT OF THE NEW YORK UNEMIPLOYMEVT INSURANCE ADVISORY
COUNeCIL,(1940) pt. 1, pp. 4-5.
10.VHARRY A. MILLIS AND ROYAL E. MONTGOMERY, LABOR's RISKS AND SOCIAL IN-
SURANCE (1938) 162; RICHARD A. LESTER AND CHARLES V. KIDD, THE CASE AGAINST EX-
PERIENCE RATING (1939) 24-30.
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his products to fill in slack seasons may cause some other employer to
lay off workers because part of his market has disappeared.
Aside from the relation of individual employers to unemployment
and its causes, a real question remains whether possible reductions in
unemployment tax rates can ever be effective as a stimulus to employ-
ment regularization. Those who are opposed to experience rating
believe that any savings that might be offered employers through re-
ductions in their unemployment taxes would add little or nothing to
the financial incentives employers already have to regularize their
operations. "Nor is it necessary," stated the majority of the New York
Advisory Council in 1940, "once more to point out that the losses which
an employer sustains because of the irregular operation of his plant
exceed by a wide margin the fullest contribution that could be asked of
him for unemployment insurance. Thus, every employer has these
many years already had a financial incentive to stabilize, greater than
any savings that can be promised him under any system of experience
rating." 11 Those who favor experience rating, on the other hand, see
the reductions in tax rates that may be granted under experience rating
as an "immediate and obvious" addition to the rewards that might be
gained through more regular operations. They also urge that possible
savings through the tax reductions can be expected to have psycho-
logical effects "that would enhance the force of all other incentives." 12
Wherever the line of truth may lie between these conflicting view-
points, there has been a noticeable shift in emphasis from unemploy-
ment prevention to cost allocation as the most important objective of
experience rating. After a survey of unemployment compensation
operations in eleven States, the Ives Committee reported in 1943,
"Stabilization of employment [as an objective of experience rating]
is barely being talked about in the present period." 13 This was ac-
counted for on the basis of war conditions. But the change in emphasis
began before the war and reflects not only changes in views concerning
the major functions of an unemployment compensation system, but
also a growing recognition that the reduction in rates which are per-
mitted under the state systems depend less on an employer's achieve-
ments in preventing unemployment than on such factors as the general
11. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK UNEnPLOY.MIENr InsuRCm ADviSORy Co ;c u,
(1940) pt. 1, p. 1. See also 2 INTERsTATE CONFERENCE OF E.IPLOviENT SECURITY AGE;-
aIEs, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE oN EMPLOYER EXPERIENCE RATING (1940). The majority
of the committee concluded after e-xtensive study of the problem that the control of the
individual employer over unemployment is "too limited to justify the use of variable tax
rates as an incentive to stabilization."
12. HERMAN FELDMAN .ND DONALD Al. SmITH, THE CASE FOR EXPERMNcE RA :n
(1939) 7.
13. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JOINT LEGISLATME COMITTEE ONT INDUSTRIAL
AND LABOR CONDITIONS (1943) 120.
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level of employment, the industry he happens to be in, and the place
his business is located.1
4
Cost Allocation.
Allocation of the costs of unemployment to individual employers as
contemplated by the second major objective of experience rating has
never meant more than allocation of the cost of the benefits paid out as
unemployment compensation. These costs may be limited, depending
upon the extent to which the system compensates unemployed work-
ers; and in any event will never represent the total social costs of un-
employment. Beyond the point that unemployment is compensated
under the systems, the cost of unemployment will continue to be borne
by workers and society as a whole.
The objective of cost allocation is in part an expression of the view
that unemployment compensation benefits should be reflected in the
prices of good' produced. "The perennial major problem of organized
society is so to devise its legal and economic rules that the price system
will adequately reflect social costs and conserve social standards. The
social and human costs of irregular employment should properly be
charged against and compensated by each employing unit. Only in this
way can consumers be assured that a low price is not a misleading and
parasitic price,. and that the competitive (or other) system is really
functioning in the public interest." 11 But this view of the function of
rate differentiation rests on concepts of shifting and incidence of taxes
which are by no means uniformly accepted by students of the subject.15
Critics of experience rating point to the complexities of the various
processes of shifting and incidence as well as to the speculative charac-
ter of the factors which go to influence prices. 7
The objections to cost allocation as a desirable objective do not stop
here. Serious questions are raised whether it is wise social fiscal policy
to put the burden of the unemployment taxes on industries character-
ized by unemployment not within their control. "We must conclude,"
stated a majority of the Committee on Experience Rating of the Inter-
state Conference of Employment Security Agencies in 1940, "that there
exists in our present economic pattern wide variation in the stability or
regularity of employment due to forces beyond the control of the indi-
1/14. See RHODE ISLAND UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD, FIFTH ANNUAL RE-
toRT (1940) 13-20.
15. Raushenbush, The Wisconsin Idea: Unemployment Reserves (1933) 170 ANNALS
65, 72.
i 16. CARL S. SHOUP, THE PROSPECTS FOR A STUDY OF THE EcONOSIIC EFFECTS OF PAY-
ROLL TAXES (1941); HARRY A. MILLIS AND ROYAL E. MONTGOMERY, LABOR'S RISKS AND
SocrALINSURANCE (1938) 162.
/-fi. RICHARD A. LESTER AND CHARLES V. KIDD, THE CASE AGAINST EXPERIENCE
RATING (1939) 43-5.
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vidual employer or even of groups of employers. The highest degree of
instability exists in the construction industry, in mining, and in the
capital goods or durable goods industries. These are what might be
termed the cornerstones of the business and employment structure. It
follows that a penalty imposed on the basic industries-principally be-
cause of uncontrollable factors-will have adverse effects on the whole
national economy. Such a tax is clearly against national policy." 13
Those who are opposed to experience rating do not see in it even the
element of fairness that cost allocation is supposed to achieve. They
view the differential tax as a highly discriminatory tax. "The concept
of merit rating with individual tax rates rebels against the accepted
principle of taxation used in this country that all taxpayers in the same
class share equally the cost of government." 1
Tax Reduction and Volume of Reenue.
The dual objectives of experience rating, reflected with varying em-
phasis and effect in the systems that the states have adopted, have not
furnished the sole principles of growth. Two other elements have
entered into the development of the state experience rating systems,
often with predominating force. The first of these is tax reduction.
"... it is the cost as expressed in the premium rate," stated I. M.
Rubinow in 1936, "and not the possible stabilizing influence of pre-
mium rate that really matters, and .. . it is because of the prevailing
American system of placing the entire cost upon the employer, that
this whole question has become the crucial one." -' The second element
is the control over the volume of revenue needed for the payment of
benefits; it involves essentially the gearing of revenue provisions to
anticipated expenditures, a problem which is discussed elsewhere in
this issue.
2'
The use of experience rating as a device for over-all tax reduction or
as a device to control volume of revenue has been viewed by some state
administrators and legislators with misgivings.22 It is the only device,
18. 2 INTERSTATE CONFERENCE OF EMPLOYMNT SECUUTY AcENCmS, RErORT OF T HE
COM3sIrE ON EM&PLOY.ER EXPERIENCE RATIXG (1940) 42.
19. SENATE CommTTEE REPFORT oN.UNEMPLOYMENT INSURMNCE (California 1945) 79.
It has been suggested that a "strong case might be made for the position that unemployment
compensation is of most direct benefit to the trade and service industries, which will be least
likely to pay substantial contributions under experience rating." 2 I.rEpRSTTE Co .E-
ENCE OF EMPLOYMET SECURITY AGENCIES, REPORT OF TEE COMIsTTEE O; EMPLOy.ER
EXPERIENCE RATING (1940) 33.
20. Rubinow, State Pool Plans and Mferit Rating (1936) 3 LAw & Co EmP. Pnon. 65,
76. "Undoubtedly anticipated reduction in taxes is the most popular argument in favor of
experience rates." OFFICE OF UNE.MPLOYMENT COMPENSATIO,; AN'D PL,%CEMnT, Or TnE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, REPORT ON EXPERIENCE RATING (1945) 3.
21. See Clague, Tie Economics of Unemploynxt Compensation, page 53 supra.
22. SENATE COMITTEE REPORT ON UNEMEnPLoYM iENT Ir;suIA!,cE (California 1945) 41,
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however, that is available to the states for these purposes, for flat rate
reductions to all employers in a state would not meet the conditions for
additional credit allowance against the federal unemployment tax.
THE FEDERAL STANDARDS: RESERVE ACCOUNTS, GUARANTEED
EMPLOYMENT ACCOUNTS, AND POOLED FUNDS
The conditions governing the allowance of additional credit in-
cluded in the Social Security Act, and transferred with amendments in
1939 to Section 1602 of the Internal Revenue Code, do not establish a
single, ready-made system of experience rating for the states to follow.
The minimum standards are cast in terms of the type of fund, provided
by a state system, to which contributions at reduced rates may be
permitted. Standards are included covering reductions in rates of
contributions to pooled funds, partially pooled funds, guaranteed em-
ployment accounts, and individual employer reserve accounts. These
are not exclusive alternatives; various combinations of the several
types of funds are possible.
Section 1602(a) of the Internal Revenue Code reads:
"STATE STANDARDS.-A taxpayer shall be allowed an addi-
tional credit under section 1601(b) with respect to any reduced rate
of contributions permitted by a State law, only if the Board finds
that under such law-
"(1) No reduced rate of contributions to a pooled fund"3
or to a partially pooled account 24 is permitted to a person
(or group of persons) having individuals in his (or their)
employ except on the basis of his (or their) experience
with respect to unemployment or other factors bearing a
direct relation to unemployment risk during not less than
the three consecutive years immediately preceding the
computation date;
"(2) No reduced rate of contributions to a guaranteed
78-82; RHODE ISLAND UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT
(1940) 18-9, 53-4.
23. The term "pooled fund" is defined in Section 1602(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue
Code as "an unemployment fund or any part thereof (other than a reserve account or a
guaranteed employment account) into which the total contributions of persons contribut-
ing thereto are payable, in which all contributions are mingled and undivided, and from
which compensation is payable to all individuals eligible for compensation from such fund."
24. The term "partially pooled account" is defined in Section 1602(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code as "a part of an unemployment fund in which part of the fund all contribu-
tions thereto are mingled and undivided, and from which part of the fund compensation is
payable only to individuals to whom compensation would be payable from a reserve ac-
count or from a guaranteed employment account but for the exhaustion or termination of
such reserve account or of such guaranteed employment account. Payments from a reserve
account or guaranteed employment account into a partially pooled account shall not be
construed to be inconsistent with the provisions of paragraph (1) or (4) of this subsection."
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employment account 25 is permitted to a person (or a
group of persons) having individuals in his (or their) em-
ploy unless (A) the guaranty of remuneration was fulfilled
in the year preceding the computation date; and (B) the
balance of such account amounts to not less than 21.
per centum of that part of the pay roll or pay rolls for the
three years preceding the computation date by which con-
tributions to such account were measured; and (C) such
contributions were payable to such account with respect
to three years preceding the computation date;
"(3) No reduced rate of contributions to a reserve ac-
count 26 is permitted to a person (or group of persons)
having individuals in his (or their) employ unless (A) com-
pensation has been payable from such account throughout
the year preceding the computation date, and (B) the
balance of such account amounts to not less than five
times the largest amount of compensation paid from such
account within any one of the three years preceding such
date, and (C) the balance of such account amounts to not
less than 2Y2 per centum of that part of the pay roll or
pay rolls for the three years preceding such date by which
contributions to such account were measured, and (D)
such contributions were payable to such account with re-
spect to the three years preceding the computation date."
25. The term "guaranteed employment account" is defined in Section 102(c)(4) of the
Internal Revenue Code as "a separate account, in an unemployment fund, maintained with
respect to a person (or group of persons) having individuals in his (or their) employ who, in
accordance with the provisions of the State law or of a plan thereunder approved by the
State agency,
"(A) guarantees in advance at least thirty hours of work, for which remunera-
tion will be paid at not less than stated rates, for each of forty weeks (or if more,
one weekly hour may be deducted for each added week guaranteed) in a year, to all
the individuals who are in his (or their) employ in, and who continue to be available
for suitable work in, one or more distinct establishments, except that any such in-
dividual's guaranty may commence after a probationary period (included within
the eleven or less consecutive weeks immediately following the first week in which
the individual renders services), and
"(B) gives security or assurance, satisfactory to the State agency, for the ful-
fillment of such guaranties, from which account, unless such account is exhausted or
terminated, is paid all and only compensation, payable on the basis of services per-
formed for such person (or for one or more of the persons comprising the group), to
any such individual whose guaranteed remuneration has not been paid (either pur-
suant to the guaranty or from the security or assurance provided for the fulfillment
of the guaranty), or whose guaranty is not renewed and who is otherv.Ee eligible for
compensation under the State law."
26. The term "reserve account" is defined in Section 1602(c)(1) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code as "a separate account in an unemployment fund, maintained with respact to a
person (or group of persons) having individuals in his (or their) employ, from which account,
unless such account is exhausted, is paid all and only companation payable on the basis of
services performed for such person (or for one or more of the persons comprising the group)."
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What shaped the standards in the form of the type of fund to which
contributions under the state systems were paid was the absence of
agreement at the time the Social Security Act was passed concerning
the proper functions of unemployment compensation and the basic
mechanics to be employed by an unemployment compensation system.
Proposals that had been formulated in the states included the use of
five different types of unemployment funds-totally pooled, partialld
pooled, industrial funds, individual employer reserve accounts, and
guaranteed employment accountsY The major conflict centered around
the choice between an unemployment compensation system based on
employer reserve accounts and a system in which all funds were pooled,
alternatives which expressed the underlying opposition between the
views of those who saw unemployment compensation primarily as a
device to prevent unemployment and those who saw it chiefly as an
insurance device for the payment of benefits to unemployed workers.
The principal differences between the two types of organization have
been described by Miss Brandeis as follows:
"The essential elements of the employer reserve system are three.
First, employers alone contribute to the fund-there are no contri-
butions from employees or the State. Second, the contributions of
each employer, though mingled with those of others for safe-keeping
and investment purposes, are kept distinct like an account in a
bank, and can be used only to pay benefits to his own laid-off em-
ployees. Third, the rate of contribution of each employer varies di-
rectly and automatically with the size of his reserve account ...
"In contrast to the employer reserve system, a pooled insurance
set-up: (1) may include contributions from employees and the state,
as well as from employers; (2) mingles all contributions in one fund,
from which benefits are paid to all laid-off employees regardless of
their previous employer; (3) may, or may not, provide for varied
employer contribution rates under some kind of 'merit rating.' " 28
The features distinguishing the two types of organization as thus
described were almost obliterated as the systems developed. Most of
the states which provide for pooled funds require contributions only
from employers. The methods used in varying employers' rates are in
many instances not substantially different from the methods used in
reserve-account states. Of the states that still provide for individual
employer reserve accounts, none makes the worker's benefits depend
alone upon the funds in the account of his former employer; all have
established balancing or partially pooled funds from which benefits
may also be paid. These funds generally are made up in part of em-
27. Malisoff, The Emergence of Unemployment Compensation: II (1939) 54 PoL. ScL. Q,
391.
28. Brandeis, The Employer Reserve Type of Unemployment Compensation Law (1936)
3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 54, 55.
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ployer contributions, amounts syphoned from each individual em-
ployer's reserve account, interest on the state's moneys in the Federal
Unemployment Trust Fund, and interest and penalties collected on
delinquent contributions.
By the end of this year the employer reserve system (modified by
the use of balancing or partially pooled funds) will continue to be em-
ployed in only four states. Wisconsin, where the system originated,
and Indiana will both go to pooled fund systems on January 1, 1946.
There are two basic reasons why the employer reserve account system,
which had the advantage in time over pooled fund plans, has not pre-
vailed. From the standpoint of the worker, the incentive idea under-
lying the reserve account system requires too high a price in making
both the worker's job and his benefits depend upon "the fortunes of a
single employer." 2 From the standpoint of employers, it probably is
not the type of fund so much as the element of rate variation in the
contributory provisions that really matters, and rate variation can be
accomplished as well under a pooled fund type of organization as under
a reserve account organization without some of the conditions made
applicable to employer reserves by the federal standards.
The minimum standards for reserve accounts set forth in Section
1602 (a) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code are couched in narrow mathe-
matical terms. The standards require, for example, that a conforming
state law permit no reduced rate of contributions to a reserve account
unless "the balance of such account amounts to not less than five times
the largest amount of compensation paid from such account within any
one of the three years preceding" the date as of which rates are deter-
mined, and unless "the balance of such account amounts to not less
than 2Y2 per centum of that part of the (employer's) payroll or payrolls
for the three years preceding such date by which contributions to such
account were measured." From the viewpoint of possible rate reduc-
tions, the first of these conditions has been thought to be particularly
onerous, since a heavy drain on an employer's account in benefit pay-
ments in any one of the three years preceding the computation date
might deprive the employer of a reduced rate even though the actual
balance in his account remained relatively large. By establishing the
state's experience rating system under a pooled-fund organization,
however, it is possible to avoid both conditions.
The widespread interest of labor organizations and other groups in
guaranteed employment plans does not show up in the experience rating
systems which the states have adopted. Only a few of the early laws
included provisions for such plans, and these have been eliminated from
29. Ricn AD A. LESrR, EcoNomics OF LABOR (1941) 446. Feldman and Smith in
stating the case for experience rating (loc. cit. supra note 2) dismissed the employer ressrve
system of experience rating as "an obviously weak straw man."
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all laws but that of Idaho,3" and in this state the provisions have had no
practical effect. 31 Lack of support for an experience rating system based
on guaranteed employment accounts has been ascribed to adminis-
trative difficulties which such plans entail and provisions of the federal
minimum standards which make theln unattractive to employers.
Under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code applicable to guar-
anteed employment accounts, a guaranteeing employer would be re-
quired by the state law to guarantee employment in advance to all his
employees, would have to provide security satisfactory to the state for
the fulfillment of his guarantee, and in addition would have to pay
contributions to his account until the balance therein aggregated 24
percent of his payrolls for three years-and in the end could be allowed
additional credit for a lower rate permitted by the state law only if his
"guarantee of remuneration was fulfilled in the year preceding the
computation date." On the side of protection for the worker, guaran-
teed employment plans as envisaged by the minimum standards of the
federal act have also not been regarded as fully satisfactory; as in the
case of the reserve account system, unless such a plan were accom-
panied by provisions for balancing or partially pooled funds, the
worker's job and his benefits would depend entirely upon a single
employer.1
2
Just as features of the employer reserve account system of experi-
ence rating may be accomplished under a pooled fund organization, so
it is possible that a system of experience rating based on guaranteed
employment plans might be included within the framework of a pooled
fund organization and within the requirements of the Internal Revenue
Code applicable to reduced rates of contribution to pooled funds. This
has never been attempted. Whether current interest in such plans 11
will lead to a study of the prospects in this direction is conjectural.
If the minimum federal standards applicable to additional credit
allowance for reduced rates of contributions to employer reserve ac-
counts and guaranteed employment accounts limit somewhat the range
of discretion of the states in formulating such plans, the pooled fund
standards of the Internal Revenue Code,34 in contrast, are broad and
30. IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932, Supp. 1940) § 43A-607A.
.31. ". . . up to the present time [Nov. 9, 1943] no employer has met the requirements
and applied for exemption under the guaranteed employment plan contained in the Un-
employment Compensation Law." CCH Unemployment Ins. Serv.-Idaho 1800 (Ex-
planation of the Law: Merit Rating-Stabilization of Employment-Reducing Payroll
Taxes].
32. For a discussion of guaranteed employment plans in relation to the requirements of
the Federal standards see Hibbard, Guaranteed Employment Plans (1936) 3 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 89; see also Rubinow, State Pool Plans and Merit Rating (1936) 3 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 65.
33. See Ellickson, Labor's Demand for Real Employment Security, page 253 infra; JAC1C
CHERNICK AND GEORGE C. HELLICKSON, GUARANTEED ANNUAL WAGES (1945).
34. Section 1602(a)(1) (1939).
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leave the states a -wide choice as to the particular methods to be em-
ployed in their systems of experience rating. The conditions essential
to additional credit allowance for reductions permitted under a State
law are three: (1) any reduced rate of contribution permitted to an
employer 3r is to be based on his "experience"; (2) this experience is to
be " ith respect to unemployment or other factors bearing a direct
relation to unemployment risk"; (3) the experience on the basis of
which a reduced rate is permitted to an employer must cover a period
of not less than three years. Various methods and devices for the
variation of employers' rates have been formulated within the frame-
work of these requirements.
RATING \'IETHODS
The formulas which state experience rating systems employ in deter-
mining rates of contribution consist in general of three main elements.
The first is a measure or indicator of the employer's experience. The
second is an index of each employer's experience, representing a reduc-
tion of the experience of different employers to comparable terms.'5
The third is the assignment of rates of contribution to each employer.
In terms of Section 1602(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, the first
represents the factor or factors "bearing a direct relation to unemploy-
ment risk", the last two the process whereby a reduced rate permitted
an employer is determined "on the basis of his . . . experience."
The Formulas Used.
A brief description of the formulas that are in use will serve to indi-
cate their general structure.3
1. Reserve Ratio. This is the formula of the employer reserve account
system of experience rating. That it was carried over and applied to
pooled fund laws should not be surprising. The reserve ratio is by far
the most common of the systems used by the states. Its essential
features are quite simple. All benefits charged to the employer's ac-
count are subtracted from the amounts he has paid to the fund. The
resulting figure is the employer's theoretical reserve and represents the
amount he has provided, or failed to provide, to meet the cost of the
benefits to his workers. The amount of the employer's reserve is next
divided by his payroll during a past period in order to reduce the re-
serves of different employers, large and small, to a comparable basis.
35. Under the standards a state may also permit reduced rates of contribution to a
group of employers, based on group experience. While a number of states have included in
their systems provisions for group rating, there has been no e\xensive ua of theze proviEions
by employers.
36. Such an index is not developed under the system used in New Yorh.
37. No attempt is made in this description to enumerate the details, which may vary
widely from state to state.
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The quotient thus obtained is the employer's reserve ratio and is the
index on which rates are assigned in accordance with a fixed schedule.
2. Benefit Ratio. Under this system benefits alone, rather than the
excess of an employer's contributions over benefits, constitute the
measure of experience. All benefits charged to an employer over a past
period are divided by his payroll during the same period. The quotient
thus obtained is known as the employer's benefit ratio. For purposes of
assigning rates, under most benefit ratio systems, all employers are
grouped according to their benefit ratios. The groups are made up to
correspond with rate categories of a schedule that is provided, and each
employer is assigned the rate applicable to his group.
3. Benefit Wage RatioA5 Instead of the employer reserve balance or
benefits as the measure of experience, this system uses wages paid a
compensated worker on which his benefits are based. When a worker is
paid unemployment benefits each of his former employers is charged
with the amount of wages he paid the worker during the worker's base
period.39 The wages so charged are known as "benefit wages" or
"beneficiary wages." A ratio between all such wages charged against
an employer during a three-year period and his total payroll during the
same years is established which is known as the "employer's experi-
ence factor." Rates are not assigned directly in accordance with this
index. Each employer's experience factor is first correlated with a state
experience factor representing a ratio of all benefits paid in the state
during the same three-year period to the benefit wages charged to all
employers during that period. Under a schedule of rates which is pro-
vided, each employer's rate approximates the product of his experience
factor multiplied by the state experience factor.
4. Compensable Separation Ratio. The measure of experience under
this plan is the weekly benefit amount of a worker who is paid unem-
ployment compensation. The ratio of the total of such weekly benefit
amounts charged to an employer over a three-year period to his payroll
during the same years forms his experience rating index. All employers
are grouped according to their indexes, and rates are assigned in ac-
cordance with a statutory schedule. Only Connecticut uses this plan.
40
5. Annual and Quarterly Payroll Decreases and Age. This is the plan
which has been established in New York.41 It departs from other plans,
first, in making no use of benefit payments in the measure of employer
38. This system is sometimes called the "Texas Plan" or the "Cliffe Plan."
39. A wporker's "base period" under state unemployment compensation laws is gen-
erally a four calendar-quarter period preceding (by at least one calendar quarter) the work-
er's benefit year. The wages earned by a worker in his base period determine his weekly
benefit amount and, unless the state law provides for uniform duration, the maximum
amount of benefits he may be paid during his benefit year.
40. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1939 Supp.) § 1337e.
41. N. Y. Laws 1945, c. 646.
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experience and, second, in providing for the distribution of dollar
credits to employers for application on future contributions. The meas-
ure of experience is a composite based on annual and quarterly payroll
decreases over a period of three years and the number of years the
employer has been subject to contributions under the state law. The
different elements are described as "annual factor," "quarterly fac-
tor," and "age factor." The "employer's experience factor," made up
of his annual factor, quarterly factor, and age factor, determines in
which of six classes he will be placed for purposes of computing any
credit which is to be assigned to him. The total credit for allotment to
all employers each year is an amount (called "surplus") by which the
state's unemployment fund exceeds four times the amount of contribu-
tions payable by all employers during the preceding calendar year, not
to exceed in any event 60 percent of the contributions payable during
that year. The credit assigned to each employer may be applied by him
against contributions payable during a twelve-month period beginning
on July 1 following the date as of which the credit is determined.
Measures of Experience.
In all these plans the basic ingredient is the factor or factors used to
measure the employer's experience. Under the standards of Section
1602(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, it is not necessary that the
state plan, as a condition to additional credit allowance for employers
permitted reductions in rates, employ a factor or factors that wi11 meas-
ure precisely each employer's experience with unemployment, or, for
that matter, that will measure such experience at all. What is required
is that the factors used bear "a direct relation to unemployment risk,"
which is quite different. The measures of experience which are pro-
vided in all the state plans have been recognized by the Social Security
Board as "factors bearing a direct relation to unemployment risk"
within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code.
To serve one or the other of the primary objectives of experience
rating, the measure that is used under a state's system ought necessarily
to reflect each employer's performance in terms of the cost of unem-
ployment which he places upon the fund, or of his performance in
stabilizing his employment. In this respect it has been pointed out that
employment stability may mean different things.42 It may mean the
42. --RcAmam A. LTER AND CHARLEs V. KID, Tnn CASE AGAsT EXPEnIE_;CE
RATmG (1939) 8. "A tentative definition of stabilization would be 'the maintenance of a
labor force of approximately the same size for approximately the same number of hours par
week over a particular period.' This would rule out all extreme work spreading, but would
allow some flexibility of hours in order to avoid minor fluctuations in employment. Dove-
tailing of employment between two or more firms would have to be excluded, however, and
this illustrates the impossibility of a rigid definition." Myers, Empoyment Stabl zatior anrd
f1w Wisconsin Act (1939) 29 Am. Ecox. REv. 711.
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maintenance by the employer of the same individuals in his employ,
If so, the measure of experience to, be used would require a periodic ac-
counting of any changes in the employer's personnel. If, on the other
hand, employment sthbility means the maintenance by the employer
of, a particular volume of employment, then the logical measures of
stability would be the number of manhours of employment given by
the employer from period to period, the number of persons employed
by him from period to period, or, perhaps, fluctuations in his total
payroll. All these measures, however, would disregard benefit costs to
the fund that might result from labor turnover. The measures which
the state systems have in fact incorporated in their formulas represent
a compromise between the dual objectives of experience rating, and are
intended to attain a reflection of both stability and cost.
The compensation of unemployed workers appears as an element in
the measure of employers' experience in all the state systems except
New York. In the benefit ratio system benefit payments alone are
used as the measure of experience. Benefit payments are primarily
indicators of cost and will not necessarily measure the degree of stability
achieved by an employer. They reflect the unemployment of the indi-
vidual worker only to the extent that unemployment is compensated
under the state unemployment compensation law, and will not reflect
potential risk as between different employers due to lay-offs or separa-
tions. For example, one worker may find a job the same day his former
employer lays him off and will thus draw no benefits, while another
worker may remain unemployed and draw benefits during the full
period allowed under the state law. With benefits as the measure of
experience, therefore, the rate determined for an employer may depend
a good deal more on the adequacy of the system in paying benefits and
on factors of chance than on the employer's actual performance in
stabilizing his operations.
Benefit payments are also used in the reserve ratio formula, coupled,
however, with contributions which the employer has paid to the fund.
The composite measure includes both benefits paid to the employer's
workers and the provision made by the employer to finance the risk of
benefits which may become payable because of his status as a covered
employer. The same chance factors are reflected in the measure, then,
that are present where benefit payments are used alone as the measure
of experience, as in the benefit ratio formula. In addition, the use of
contributions as a part of the measure of experience will have a varying
effect on an employer's rate from year to year, resulting from the opera-
tion of the formula itself. A low rate which an employer may receive in
one year will produce a lesser amount of contributions in relation to the
same volume of payroll and will affect the balance in the employer's
account on which his rate will be based in the following year.
[Vol. 55 :218
EXPERIENCE RATING
The systems which employ the benefit wage factor or the compensa-
ble separation factor as the measure of experience represent an attempt
to escape some of the chance factors in the rating process which are the
inevitable result of the use of benefit payments. Underlying both the
benefit wage and compensable separation factors is the %iew that the
actual duration of a worker's benefits may depend less upon his separa-
tion from a particular employer than on the worker's initiative in seek-
ing employment, the ability of the employment service to place him,
and the state of the labor market. As found in the only system which
uses compensable separations, the measure consists of the weekly
benefit amount of a worker who is separated and draws benefits.
Benefit wages, on the other hand, represent compensable separations
weighted by the worker's base period wages. Neither measure reflects
the length of time a worker may draw benefits and, therefore, will not
furnish an indication of the benefit costs placed upon the fund by indi-
vidual employers. As measures of employment stability, both depend
upon the payment of compensation to workers who have been sepa-
rated from their jobs, and are therefore affected by the benefit eligibility
and disqualification provisions of the state law, as well as by chance
factors which may determine whether or not a separated worker drawzs
benefits. The benefit wage factor as a measure of an employer's per-
formance in stabilizing his operations is further impaired by the provi-
sions which the systems make for correlating it with a state-wide factor,
the effect of which is to adjust the measure of each individual employ-
er's experience by the average duration of compensable unemployment
for the entire state.
43
Fluctuations in payroll as a measure of experience are not an indi-
cator of the benefit load an employer may place upon the fund. They
will serve to measure some sort of stability, but they %il not indicate
labor turnover, nor will they necessarily reflect maintenance of a par-
ticular volume of total employment, since an employer's payrolls from
period to period may be influenced as much by changes in wage rates,
payments of bonuses, the difference in the number of paydays falling
within different periods, and other extraneous factors, as by the amount
of employment he furnishes. The use of payroll fluctuations as a meas-
ure of employment stability is further limited under the system estab-
43. ". . . beneficiary wages [as a measure of employer experience] do not measure
anything which furnishes a particularly valid reason for changing an employer's contribu-
tion rate. They do not measure the amount of unemployment in his establishment or the
instability of his employment, or the amount of benefits paid to his uhemployed -worl:her."
WALTER AATSCHECK AND RAYMO'ND C. ATxiNSON, PROBLEMS AND PRocEDUREs Or UN'-
EMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION IN TEM STATES (Public Administration Service No. 65, 1939)
66. The Committee on Employer Experience Rating of the Interstate Conference of Em-
ployment Security Agencies found the use of the measure "difficult to justify on any ground
other than simplicity of administration." 1 IN-TERsTATE CO.mFEnNC Or EMFLO t =T
SEcURITy AGENcIES, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON EXPERImCE RAT-;G (1940) 37.
1945]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
lished in New York, which gives to an employer's annual decreases in
payrolls double the weight that it gives to his quarterly decreases, and
adjusts both by the years the employer has paid contributions. "The
most hopeful point of attack in preventing unemployment," Paul A.
Raushenbush stated in 1933, "is obviously to lessen fluctuations within
the relatively normal year. Such fluctuations result not only from
physically seasonal causes, but partly from created customer habits
and partly from sheer haphazard causes. The possibilities of stabiliza-
tion in this field are rather generally conceded." 11 By the weight it
gives to an employer's annual payroll decreases and his age, the New
York plan seems to eliminate from the measure of experience incentives
toward stabilization where these might most likely be effective.
Relating the Measure to the Individual Employer.
A part of the problem of selecting an appropriate factor with which
to measure employers' experience is the problem of relating the factor
that is selected to individual employers. Unlike work injuries which
happen during the course of employment for a particular employer, a
worker's unemployment occurs generally after severance of the employ-
ment relation. Before he became unemployed a worker may have had
one or more employers. Where benefits are used as the measure of
experience or as an element of the measure, to which of the worker's
former employers are they to be attributed? Or in the language of
experience rating, to which employer shall the benefits be charged?
The problem fundamentally is that of assessing responsibility for
unemployment, which is a major part of the business of experience
rating, whether considered from the standpoint of stabilization or cost
allocation. No common view has been worked out, however, as to the
methods by which such responsibility is properly to be determined.
Two general principles have been proposed, and both have their sup-
porters. The first is that the unemployment of a worker is attributable
to the employer or employers whose action in separating him, or in
retaining him at reduced hours and wages, is nearest in time to the
unemployment. 45 The second is the principle that the compensable
unemployment of an individual is attributable to the employer or
employers whose wage payments to him form the basis and the meas-
ure of his benefit rights.46 Some state systems have followed the first
principle in establishing a method of charging, and some have followed
the second. Others have attempted to reach a middle ground, and have
adopted methods which reflect in some instances a combination of the
44. Raushenbush, The Wisconsin Idea: Unemployment Reserves (1933) 170 ANNALS 70.
45. This principle is favored in HERMAN FELDMAN AND DONALD M. SMITH, THE CASE
FOR EXPERIENCE RATING (1939).
46. This is the principle favored in I INTERSTATE CONFERENCE OF EMPLOYMENT SE-
CURITY AGENCIES, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYER EXPERIENCE RATING (1940).
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two general principles, and in other instances an effort to accommodate
theoretical difficulties to the practical necessities of administration.
An enumeration of the most common charging methods vill serve to
indicate the extent of the uncertainty and lack of conviction in this
field. Methods which are in use include charging to: (1) the last em-
ployer only, (2) the last and preceding employers in inverse chrono-
logical order of employment, (3) the last base period employer only,
(4) the last base period employer and preceding base period employers
in inverse chronological order of employment, (5) all base period em-
ployers in proportion to wages paid by each, (6) the base period em-
ployer from whom the largest amount of the worker's wage credits were
earned, (7) any employer who employed the worker during at least four
different calendar weeks in the 56-day period before the unemployment
for which the worker was paid benefits.
Systems which allocate charges to the employer who last employed
a worker rely on the principle that an individual's unemployment is
attributable to the employer whose action in separating the individual
is nearest in time to the individual's unemployment. Unemployment
follows employment with a particular employer, but this does not mean
necessarily that an individual's last employer caused his unemploy-
ment. A worker may have lost his regular job and become unemployed
at the time his last employer hired him. By giving him work for a short
period, it might reasonably be concluded that the last employer instead
of causing the worker's unemployment actually reduced it. States
which follow the second principle that the compensable unemployment
of an employee is attributable to the employer whose wage payments
to him form the basis of his benefit rights, or follow a combination of
the two principles, avoid some of the anomalies inherent in charging
only the last employer but in doing so may produce results which are
also questionable. For example, under some of these charging methods,
a worker's last employer may escape all responsibility for the worker's
unemployment while charges are made to an employer whom the
worker left over two years before his unemployment occurred.
At the time a worker becomes unemployed, he will in many instances
have had only one employer since the beginning of his base period.
Where this is true the results obtained under the various methods of
charging employed by the state systems will be the same. However,
in those instances where the worker has had more than one employer,
the various methods may be expected to give different results.
The Payroll Factor and Contribution Rates.
The measure of an employer's experience as it appears in his record
under the state formulas is in terms of dollar amounts. Two further
steps are involved under most formulas in the translation of such empe-
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rience into an actual adjusted contribution rate. The first is the devel-
opment of an index in order to establish a comparison between the
experience of different employers. For this purpose all the formulas
(except New York, where payroll decreases for each employer are ex-
pressed in percentage terms) use the employer's dollar payroll over a
past period as a measure of exposure to unemployment risk. The final
step is the translation of the indexes thus established into contribution
rates.
The payroll that is used as the measure of exposure in the reserve
ratio formula is generally the employer's average payroll over a three
or five preceding year period. In the benefit ratio, the benefit wage,
and compensable separation formulas, the payroll is generally the em-
ployer's total payroll during the three-year experience period. Changes
in payroll may affect the rate that is determined for the employer, and
if the changes are sharp they may cause violent fluctuations in rate.
It is notable that increases and decreases in payroll do not have the
same effects under the different formulas. Under the reserve ratio
formula, high reserve ratios produce low tax rates, while low reserve
ratios produce high rates. Without any change in the measure of an
employer's experience, therefore, an increase in an employer's payroll
may give him a higher rate, while a decrease in his payroll may give
him a lower rate. Under the other formulas the effect of changes in
payrolls is reversed. An increase in an employer's payroll may have the
effect of reducing his tax rate, while a decrease in his payroll may have
the effect of raising his tax rate. Under all plans, of course, the more
drastic the change in payrolls, the more immediate will be the effect
on the employer's rate.41
At the end of the rating process is the assignment of a specific tax
rate to each employer (or the assignment of the credit which is provided
for under the New York system). As the description of the various
formulas has indicated, the methods that are employed by the state
systems in assigning rates differ widely. Under the reserve ratio for-
mula, for example, the relationship between an employer's rate and his
experience index is direct; each employer is assigned the rate appearing
in a fixed schedule that is applicable to his experience index. Under
most benefit ratio systems, on the other hand, an employer's rate will
depend upon the employer group in which his experience index puts
him, and will be influenced by the experience of other employers." A
47. For further discussion see Experience-Rating Operations in 1943, SociAL SEcuRITY
BULLETIN, Sept. 1944, pp. 11-19; Clague, The Economics of Unemployment Compensation,
page 53 supra.
48. The grouping of employers is according to their indexes and the number of classes
that there are contribution rates to be assigned, each class being made up of an equal amount
of the total state payroll in the previous year. For example, if the rate schedule consists of
five rates and the total state payroll were $500,000, the employers with the lowest benefit
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particular employer may continue year after year to have the same
ratio of benefits to payroll but nevertheless receive a different tax rate
in each year because of changes in the experience ratios of other em-
ployers. Under the benefit wage systems, each employer's index is
adjusted by state-wide experience in the payment of benefits during the
previous year, and rate schedules are constructed to yield a return to
the fund merely sufficient to replenish the amount of benefits paid
during the previous year. Whatever method of assigning rates is em-
ployed, the tendency has been to reduce the over-all range of the rate
differentials by lowering the maximum rate to 2.7 percent. Of the 45
states which now provide for experience rating, the highest rate in 2S
of them is 2.7 percent.
SOME EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE RATING IN PRACTICE
There is little evidence up to this time of achievement of employment
stabilization through experience rating. The expanding volume of war
employment since most experience rating systems became effective has
permitted no real test. A study of the Wisconsin system made by
Charles A. Myers during 1937 and 1938 1 indicated that a number of
employers had made efforts to stabilize their operations with some
degree of success under the stimulus of possible tax savings. But the
study also disclosed that the differential tax tended to stabilize under-
employment and to increase "somewhat the volume of unemployment."
None of the state systems is designed to reward an expanding volume
of employment. The systems tend rather to retard the hiring of work-
ers because any increase in an employer's force will subject him to a
higher tax rate if he should fail to give all his workers continuous em-
ployment and the workers who are laid off draw benefits. It is appar-
ent, on the other hand, that existing experience rating systems are not
devised to separate stability achieved through positive efforts on the
part of the individual employer from stable employment which may be
characteristic of the industry or business in which the employer is
engaged, or which may be due to general economic conditions. An
employer in the utilities industry may receive the lowest rate without
doing a thing to stabilize, while an employer in the durable goods in-
dustry may receive the highest rate despite all his efforts to reduce
unemployment in his operations.
Of more serious significance from the standpoint of unemployment
compensation is the fact that under all but one of the systems an em-
ployer's tax rate depends not upon how much unemployment he may
ratios representing the first $100,000 of payroll would be given the lowest rate. The em-
ployers with the highest ratios representing the last $100,000 of payroll would he given the
highest rate, and the others would range betveen.
49. Myers, Employnmnt Stalilizalion and the Wisconain .41 (1939) 29 Am!. EcOa. Rrv.
708.
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have but upon the volume of compensable unemployment among his
former workers. From efforts to reduce unemployment, the step is but
a short one to efforts to avoid the payment of benefits through prac-
tices which do not stabilize employment and through provisions de-
signed to disqualify workers from receiving benefits." Practices in-
tended to avoid benefits without stabilization, which have been em-
ployed under the stimulus of experience rating include work spreading,
the hiring of ineligible workers such as students, the laying off of em-
ployees with the lowest accumulation of wage credits, and the hiring
or laying off of employees at such times as will prevent the payment of
partial unemployment benefits." Of the effect of experience rating on
the benefit provisions in the state laws, the Ives Committee had this
to say:
"In all the States which the group surveyed it appeared that the
entire benefit program was modified and restricted because of expe-
rience rating. Whenever it was pointed out that the administration
of a benefit system was awkward or unnatural, the answer always
was 'This is because of experience rating.' The unrealistic disquali-
'fication program, which on the surface appears to be for the purpose
of elimination of anomalies, in effect disqualifies large classes of
covered workers because of the desire to minimize benefits in order
to create low contribution rates. Among the individuals within
these classes, there are thousands who under normal circumstances
should be paid." 52
As an alternative to measures distorting the disqualification provi-
sions of state laws, the Social Security Board suggested to the states
at the end of 1944 that provisions might be adopted eliminating all
charges to employers' experience rating records for benefits paid to
unemployed workers under certain circumstances. 3 Charges might be
omitted, for example, where benefits were paid a worker who at some
previous time had voluntarily left a job with good personal cause
50. "More important and more serious is the fact that under all experience rating pro-
visions now in unemployment compensation laws . . . it is possible to reduce compensable
unemployment without reducing unemployment through taking advantage of the qualifica-
tions and exclusions of these laws so as to throw most of the unemployment into the groups
among the employees who have no benefit rights." Witte, Whither Unemployment Compen-
sation in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT SECURITY (Univ. of Minn.
1940) 55.
51. See Myers, Employment Stabilization and the Wisconsin Act (1939) 29 Am.. ECoN.
REv. 708.
52. REPORT OF THE NEW YoRE STATE JOINT LEGISLATIVE CO.'MITTEE ON INDUSTRIAL
AND LABOR CONDITIONS (1943) 121. See also Clague and Reticker, Trends in Disqualif/ca.
tion from Benefits Under State Unemployment Compensation Laws, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLE-
TIN, Jan. 1944, pp. 12-23; Bigge, Strength and Weakness of Our Unemployment Compensation
Program, SOCIAL SECURTY BULLETIN, Feb. 1944, pp. 5-11.
53. Unemployment Compensation Program Letter No. 78, Dec. 29, 19,4.
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although perhaps without "good cause attributable to the employer." 1
There was nothing essentially new in the Board's suggestion; many
states had already adopted provisions for non-charging in situations of
this kind, as well as in other situations.
Pressures for tax reduction through experience rating which lead to
benefit avoidance without stabilization and to harsh disqualification
provisions also are reflected in the character of experience rating plans
themselves. The non-charging device, for example, may serve to neu-
tralize in part the influence of the differential tax on the disqualifica-
tion provisions of a state unemployment compensation law. For experi-
ence rating, however, non-charging means a spreading of costs among
all employers instead of the allocation of costs to specific employers,
and may in addition result in the elimination of all incentive to stabili-
zation where it might most likely be effective. The list of situations to
which non-charging is applied is a long one. It includes the omission of
charges that may be relatively small, as well as the omission of charges
which may be of major significance in terms of the rate which the em-
ployer receives. For example, under some state laws which contain
special provisions applicable to seasonal unemployment (themselves
prompted largely by experience rating) all charges to a seasonal em-
ployer may be eliminated for unemployment of his seasonal workers
occurring outside the normal season.55
Examples of the force of tax reduction which tend seriously to impair
experience rating as a stabilization or cost allocation device may be
multiplied. A number of these have already been mentioned in the
discussion of the rating methods which the states have adopted. One
not previously discussed which stands out is the use by some systems
of voluntary contributions in the rate adjustment process. Through
this device an employer, by making a small additional payment, may
escape liability for contributions that would otherwise be assessed
against him."5 Another example is the action taken in many states of
lowering the maximum rate of contributions to 2.7 percent. Apart from
aspects of financing and solvency, which are discussed elsewhere in this
issue,57 it is generally recognized that if experience rating is to furnish
any real incentive to stabilization, the maximum tax savings possible
to an employer must be at least large enough to offset the inconven-
iences and costs of such stabilization. In stating the case for experience
rating, Feldman and Smith expressed the view in 1939 that, "present
54. See Simrell, Employer Fault vs. General Welfare as the Basis of Urnemp!oyrxrt Cor,-
pensation, page 181 supra.
55. See Linnenberg, Seasonal Employers and Scasonal Workers Under State Uninploy-
ment Compensation Laws, SOC-%L SECURITY BuLLiErm, Nov. 1944, pp. 13-26.
56. See REPORT OF THE NEw YORK STATE JoInT LEGISLATIVE CO.rITTEE ON INDUS-
TRIAL AND LABOR CoNDITIONs (1943) 124.
57. See Clague, The Economics of Unemployment Compensation, page 53 supra.
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rate differentiations are too small to serve as a stimulus to regulariza-
tion to certain employers whose costs of stabilization would be high.
If the maximum were 5 or 6 percent and the possible rate of
saving about 4 percent, an ample incentive to employment stabiliza-
tion should be provided," 58 Yet, as of this time, only seventeen states
provide for tax rates above 2.7 percent (aside from so-called "war-
risk contributions" 69); and the highest rate provided under any state
system of experience rating is 4 percent.
The varying conditions under which reduced rates are allowed in
the different state systems has had the result, which the uniform federal
payroll tax was intended to avoid, of giving competing employers in
different states contributions at varying rates even where their unem-
ployment experience may not be substantially different. This has led
to competition between the states in rate reduction whose effects, as
indicated in the preceding discussion, show up not only in the character
of the experience rating plans that are adopted but also in the provi-
sions which each state makes for the compensation of its unemployed
workers. 0
Several proposals have been offered which seek to crorrect deficiencies
in the present experience rating systems (or to eliminate such systems)
through amendment of the additional credit provisions in the Internal
Revenue Code. One of these would remove the additional credit pro-
visions entirely and thus destroy the foundation on which the state
experience-rating systems rest. Another proposal would write into the
additional credit provisions of the Internal Revenue Code minimum
standards which would, on the one hand, limit the amount of rate
reductions that might be permitted through experience rating, and, on
the other hand, establish specifications relating to the scale of benefits
provided under the state unemployment compensation laws. Feldman
and Smith, writing in 1939, viewed national standards of this character
as essential to the proper functioning of experience rating."' Such
standards were also advocated in 1940 by the majority of the Com-
mittee on Employer Experience Rating of the Interstate Conference of
Employment Security Agencies. 2
11- 58. HERmAN FELDMAN AND DONALD M. SMITH, THE CASE FOR EXPERIENCE RATING
(1939) 7.
59. For a discussion of provisions that a number of states have made for the collection
of additional contributions from certain employers whose payrolls have expanded during the
war see Friedman, War-Risk Contribution Provisions in State Unemployment Compensation
Laws, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, May 1944, pp. 2-8.
60. SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT (1942) 16, and NINT11 ANNUAL
REPORT (1944) 12-3.
61., -HERMAN FELDISAN AND DONALD M. SMITH, THE CASE FOR EXPERIENCE RATING
(1939) 59-60.
62. 2 INTERSTATE CONFERENCE OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY AGENCIES, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYER EXPERIENCE RATING (1940).
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Whether or not any action is taken in this direction, it is generally
recognized that the existing systems are deficient in many respects and
have serious consequences from the viewpoint of unemployment com-
pensation. "Experience rating as thus far developed," stated Edwin E.
Witte in 1941, "is defective in that it does not accurately measure
differences in costs and in making it possible through various devices,
most of them anti-social, to reduce compensation costs without de-
creasing unemployment. If experience rating is to continue, it needs to
be improved." 63
63.z)Vitte, Experience Rating and Other Forms of Incentite Taxation to Prom,oe Empoy-
it in NATIONAL TAx ASS'N, PROCEEDNGS OF TmRTY-FouRwT NAT. CoNF. o.; TAXATIO:
(1941) 483.
